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1 Introduction
European integration and its economic implications constitute important and debated
issues. In the general literature, product market integration has been interpreted as a
reduction in costs associated with international trade (e.g., transport costs, tari¤s, infor-
mation costs about foreign markets, etc.). More integrated product markets would reduce
rmspower and make markets more competitive. As it is widely recognized, and remarked
in a recent speech by Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the ECB, economic integration
benets consumers through lower prices" (Berlin, 13 June 2007).1 In this short note, we
show that once one takes into account goods characterized by international" network
externalities, this need not be the case.
International network externalities arise when consumers utility increases with the
number of consumers adopting the same good or compatible goods regardless of whether
they live in their own country or abroad.2 Indeed, market integration a¤ects not only
traditional" trade barriers but also less visible non-tari¤ barriers, such as the propor-
tion of foreign network that consumers of one country can enjoy. Namely, international
network externalities can be partial because of trade policy reasons (where international
standardization constitutes a key instrument),3 or because of technical reasons linked to
the good of interest.
Accordingly, we address the following question: what is the e¤ect of product market
integration on the market equilibrium in the presence of international network externalities
in consumption? We set up a spatial two-country model with two network goods (one per
country) and consumers with heterogenous preferences for the local (foreign) good. We
nd that the economic forces at work may have an ambiguous e¤ect on prices.
As far as we know, there are a few studies about international trade in the presence
of consumption externalities. Janeba (2007) studies the benets from free trade in the
context of consumption externalities via a general equilibrium two country-model with
perfectly competitive markets. Iwasa and Kikuchi (2007) develop a two-country model
with incompatible country-specic hardware technologies which is an extension of Gandal
and Shy (1992) closed-economy model. In particular, they study the software provision
decision of software rms to hardware rms. Their work thus deals with rmsstrategies
towards vertically related rms, whereas we focus on horizontal competitors.
1http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2007/html/sp070613.en.html.
2There is a substantial amount of literature on network externalities. The seminal paper is Katz and
Shapiro (1985).
3Gandal and Shy (2001) study governmentsincentives to recognize foreign standards in the presence
of network e¤ects and conversion costs.
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2 Model
As far as the supply side is concerned, suppose that rm A, installed in country 1, produces
network good A and charges price pA; rm B, installed in country 2, produces network
good B and charges price pB. These two network goods are compatible, that is consumers
adopting good A benet from the number of consumers buying good A as well as from
the number of consumers buying good B. Nevertheless, the network e¤ect coming from
consumers living abroad is only partial as long as markets are not fully integrated. Product
market integration implies cost reductions that we model via an increase in the network
e¤ect. As an example, we think of mobile communication services. A network operator
providing this kind of service usually allows you to communicate with both consumers
adopting the same operator and consumers adopting a rival operator regardless of where
the consumers live. In other words, we can say that these services are compatible. However,
living in one country and communicating with people abroad via a mobile phone is far more
expensive than calling people in the same country. The network operator, through roaming
agreements which allow it to use the foreign network, can provide its customers abroad with
the service. Thanks to market integration, these costs are progressively decreasing. For
example, in the European Union, the Regulation on roaming charges within the European
Union which is in force since June 30, 2007, is forcing service providers to lower their
roaming fees across the 27-member bloc. The new tari¤s will be applied by September 30,
2007. Moreover, it has been planned that these Eurotari¤s" will gradually decrease over
the next three years.4
As for the demand side, we assume that each country has a continuum of consumers
of mass n indexed by x which are uniformly distributed along the interval [0; 1]. Each
consumer has a unit demand and can buy either good A or good B. In a standard way,
the utility coming from consumption depends on the intrinsic benet of the good, on the
network e¤ect, on the price and on some trade costs to buy the foreign good. Consumers
di¤er in their valuation of the intrinsic benet as well as in their valuation of the network
benet. In particular, consumers which are foreign brand-orientedvalue little the (in-
trinsic and network) benet from buying the local good and viceversa consumers which
are local brand-orientedvalue little the (intrinsic and network) benet from buying the
foreign good. We also assume that the degree of product market integration between the
two countries a¤ects consumersutility in three ways: through the intrinsic benet, the
network benet as well as through the trade costs. Namely, let n1 and n2 denote the
number of buyers (of either good) in country 1 and 2, respectively. Obviously, ni  n,
for i = 1; 2. A consumer buys at most one good and purchases either one or no unit of
4http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/activities/roaming/roaming_regulation/index_en.htm.
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any given good. Dene   0 our inverse measure of product market integration: as 
approaches zero markets become more integrated. The utility of consumer x 2 [0; 1] living
in country 1 is given by:
U1 (x) =
8>><>>:
u  c ()x+  (n1 +  ()n2) (1  x)  pA if he buys good A;
u  c () (1  x) +  (n1 +  ()n2)x  t ()  pB if he buys good B;
0 if he buys nothing.
Similarly, the utility of consumer x living in country 2 is:
U2 (x) =
8>><>>:
u  c ()x+  (n2 +  ()n1) (1  x)  pB if he buys good B;
u  c () (1  x) +  (n2 +  ()n1)x  t ()  pA if he buys good A;
0 if he buys nothing.
Thus, x 2 [0; 1] measures the consumers valuation of the foreign good. A high consumer
type (x! 1) is foreign brand-oriented; on the other hand, a low consumer type (x! 0)
is local brand-oriented. Notice that indeed consumers living closer the border may prefer
a foreign good since they are likely to have more connections with foreign residents.5
As far as the intrinsic benet is concerned, a consumer living in country 1 (in country
2) has a utility of u   c ()x, if he buys the good A (B) produced in his country, and a
utility of u c () (1  x), if he buys the good B (or A) produced in the other country. The
intrinsic benet increases with product market integration (i.e., c0 () > 0): the more the
two countries are integrated, the higher the quality of mobile phones because of a higher
mobility of high skilled workers (experts in the eld).6 In order to purchase the foreign
good, a consumer has to bear the additional cost t () which is a function of the degree
of product market integration and represents the level of administrative costs for buying
abroad. We posit t ()  0 and t0 ()  0.
As for the network benet, a consumer living in country i = f1; 2g and buying good
l = fA;Bg has a utility of  (ni + nj ()) (1  x), if he buys the local good l, and a
utility of  (ni +  ()nj)x, if he buys the foreign good (with j 6= i and j = f1; 2g).
 () 2 (0; 1) is the proportion of foreign network that a consumer can enjoy; it depends
on product market integration: 0 () < 0. The parameter   0 measures the importance
of the network size e¤ect for consumers. Therefore, the network benet also increases
with product market integration: the more markets are integrated the more consumers
of one country benet from the number of consumers of the other country adopting the
same network good or compatible goods. If we think again of the mobile communication
5Think of people living in Trentino (an Italian region located in the extreme north) versus people living
in Sicily (extreme south).
6We could think of c () as a learning cost which decreases with product market integration and in turn
makes higher the intrinsic benet of the good.
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services example, product market integration reduces the roaming costs and in turn makes
the network benet higher. Also, market integration makes more accessible to consumers
complementary products, like post-purchase services.
Overall, consumers utility is increasing in product market integration.
2.1 Demands
In order to solve the model, we assume that the market is fully covered, i.e., u is large
enough so that each consumer buys one unit of either good.7 Formally, market coverage
means that n1 = n2 = n. We rst analyze the decision problem of consumers which
choose between the goods maximizing their net surplus (for any level of prices). In this
maximization problem they take as given the decisions of the other consumers.
In each country, consumer type x buys the local good l rather than the foreign good
k if and only if U il (x)  U ik (x). Solving this inequality for both countries, we determine
the indi¤erent consumer in country 1 and 2, denoted by xC1A and x
C
2B, respectively:
U1A (x)  U1B (x)  0, x 
1
2
+
t () + (pB   pA)
2 (n (1 +  ()) + c ())
 xC1A;
U2A (x)  U2B (x)  0, x 
1
2
+
t () + (pA   pB)
2 (n (1 +  ()) + c ())
 xC2B:
In words, in country 1, consumer types x 2 0; xC1A prefer the local good A and in contrast
consumer types x 2 (xC1A; 1] prefer the foreign good B. Similarly, in country 2, consumer
types x 2 0; xC2B prefer the local good B and consumer types x 2 (xC2B; 1] prefer the
foreign good A.8 We can thus nd the total demands for the two goods, say qA and qB,
as the sum of the demands in the two countries:9
qA = n
 
xC1A + 1  xC2B

= n

1 +
(pB   pA)
n (1 +  ()) + c ()

;
qB = n
 
xC2B + 1  xC1A

= n

1 +
(pA   pB)
n (1 +  ()) + c ()

:
As we can see from the expressions above, quantities are independent of the administrative
costs t () as they are the same in both countries. Moreover, at the same price, p = pA =
pB, both rms enjoy a positive demand, in particular, qA = qB = n > 0 because of the
7We assume that u c () approaches zero: consumer type x = 1 never prefers the local over the foreign
good.
8As in most location models, goods should be su¢ ciently di¤erentiated in order to have interior
equilibria. In particular, we here focus on the market coverage case and so we have: xC1A and x
C
2A belong
to the interval [0; 1] if pA   pB 2 [t ()  (n (1 +  ()) + c ()) ; (n (1 +  ()) + c ())  t ()], which is a
non-empty interval if c () > t ()  n (1 +  ()).
9We rule out market segmentation which means that the price of each brand is the same anywhere in
the world.
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presence of horizontal di¤erentiation.10 We can also reasonably assume that the demand
for the local good increases with , as a result, there will exist an upperbound for , that
is the degree of product market integration at which countries are perfectly separated, i.e.
xC1A = x
C
2B = 1.
2.2 Price competition
Let l be the prot of rm l = fA;Bg. Both rms are producing without incurring any
production cost. Then, rm ls maximization problem becomes: maxpl l = maxpl plql.
This optimization problem results in the following equilibrium prices and quantities:
pCA = p
C
B = p
C = c () + n (1 +  ()) ;
qCA = q
C
B = q
C = n:
As in a standard linear city model, the price positively depends on what we can interpret
to be the transportation cost, c (). However, it also depends on the network e¤ect. We
have that @pC=@  0, c0 ()   n0 () :
Proposition 1 When consumers have heterogeneous preferences towards a local and a
foreign good, an increase in market integration has an ambiguous e¤ect on prices in pres-
ence of international network externalities. The higher (smaller)  is the more likely an
increase in market integration will increase (decrease) prices.
Thus, product market integration has an ambiguous e¤ect on equilibrium prices due
to the presence of two opposite forces: c0 () > 0 and 0 () < 0. As markets become more
separated, on the one hand, rmsmarket power increases so that they can set higher
prices; on the other hand, the reduction in network benet induces consumers to value
less both goods, that is their willingness to pay decreases which in turn has a negative
e¤ect on prices.
3 Concluding comments
We have shown that market integration may have an ambiguous e¤ect on prices in pres-
ence of international network externalities. This result depends on the assumption about
the compatibility between the local and foreign good. This is reasonable if we think of
mobile phones: they allow you to communicate with both consumers adopting the same
10This does not mean that there is no trade when prices are equal. Indeed, if (pB   pA) = 0, we obtain
that xC1A = x
C
2B = x
C
l  1, t () < (n (1 +  ()) + c ()) which means that trade occurs as long as trade
costs are su¢ ciently low.
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operator and consumers adopting a rival operator. However, this result does not hold
under incompatible goods. Indeed, developing the same model as before but assuming that
what matters for consumerschoice is only the number of users choosing the same good
in both countries, it can be shown that, the price only depends on c () and the e¤ect
of  is then clearly positive. Comparing compatible vs incompatible goods, we can make
the following remarks. As far as the equilibrium variables are concerned, the important
di¤erence is that when goods are compatible, the network size is the same for both goods,
as a result the network has a positive e¤ect on their values for consumers and in turn a
positive e¤ect on their prices, which indeed are increasing in . On the other hand, when
goods are not compatible, competition is tougher because rms try to conquer as many
consumers as possible in order to get a higher network than the rival rm and in turn
more consumers which, for a given intrinsic benet, value just their own network size. As
a consequence, rms price their good at the lowest possible value, i.e. as if  = 0.
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